Sharing the atmosphere : a proposal for an equitable and

sustainable global trading scheme for greenhouse gas

emissions by Bührs, Ton
Sharing the atmosphere: A proposal for
an equitable and sustainable global
trading scheme for greenhouse gas
emissions.
Ton Bührs
tbuhrs@gmail.com
CSGR Working Paper 264/10
Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation
Department of Politics and International Studies
University of Warwick
Sharing the atmosphere: a proposal for an equitable and
sustainable global trading scheme for greenhouse gas
emissions.
Ton Bührs
February, 2010
tbuhrs@gmail.com
Abstract
An emissions trading scheme is likely to be an important component of the post-Kyoto global
regime for reducing greenhouse gas emissions, primarily for economic reasons. Like most
tradable permit schemes that have thus far been adopted, notably in the United States and
Europe , it is expected that a global greenhouse gas emissions trading scheme will be based
on the ‘grandfathering principle’, allocating entitlements to emitters on the basis of existing
levels of emissions. The paper argues against this common practice as being ethically
problematic and, more broadly, that the desirability of tradable permit schemes depends in
large part on how social and political implications have been incorporated into their design. A
case is made for the allocation of emission entitlements on an equal per capita basis to all
individuals, but for the management of entitlements by specially designated community bodies
(Community Carbon Trusts) on behalf of citizens. Such an approach, based on the notion of
‘individuals-in-community’, is not only ethically more defensible, but also has the potential to
enhance local/regional capacity to mitigate and adapt to climate change, to promote
sustainable development, and to enhance democracy, without compromising the economic
rationale (cost-efficiency) for the adoption of emissions trading.
Key words: emissions trading, emission rights, environmental space, communities;
‘individuals-in-community’, sustainable development.
2Introduction
Given the likelihood that a post-Kyoto climate change agreement will include provisions
for trading greenhouse gas (GHG) emission rights (carbon credits), it is timely and
important to look more closely into the merits (or otherwise) of emissions trading
systems (ETS), in particular with regard to the issue of the allocation and distribution of
entitlements. Thus far, ETSs and other tradable permit systems have allocated
entitlements to those historically responsible for emissions or the exploitation of
resources (the ‘grandfathering’ principle). There are, however, strong reasons for
challenging this practice, and for advocating the allocation of entitlements to all people,
in line with the per capita distribution principle.
This article argues that GHG emission rights, if they are to be granted, should be
distributed on a globally determined equal per capita basis, but collectively managed by
community bodies (Community Carbon Trusts – CCTs) on an ‘individuals-in-
community’ basis, instead of being granted or sold by governments to (big) emitters. The
approach advocated here is not only ethically more justified, but offers significant socio-
environmental advantages to communities and has the potential to enhance democracy.
It thus provides an example of how a significant environmental challenge can be met in a
more positive way than by the prevailing approaches based on narrow, mainly economic,
considerations.
This article will, first, discuss shortly the idea of emissions trading and its growing
popularity with regard to the control of global GHG emissions. Second, it will focus on
the issue of the allocation and distribution of entitlements, discussing general principles
commensurable with the Contraction and Convergence and Environmental Space
approaches. Third, the more specific elements of a scheme in which emission
entitlements are formally allocated to individuals but managed collectively by
communities, and its potential for boosting sustainable development, are discussed.
Finally, some thoughts will be given to the political merits and feasibility of these ideas.
Emissions trading: An idea whose time has come?
The idea of trading emission permits finds its roots in economic theory (Baumol and
Oates, 1988: 424; Bertram, 1992). In essence, it is based in the assumption that by
allocating property rights to (portions of) a public good, the collective and individual
interests in that good can be harmonised and effectively protected. Thus, the ‘Tragedy of
the Commons’ scenario which often befalls common property resources (Hardin, 1968),
3in which the ‘rational’ pursuit by individuals of their interests leads to the destruction of a
common good, can be avoided.
In the context of public ‘bads’ such as pollution, tradable permits can be allocated to the
existing (or slightly lower) level of pollution, with the total amount allocated being
gradually reduced over time to finally achieve a level that is considered sustainable or
acceptable. All (major) emitters of the pollutant in question are required to obtain
permits for the amount that they emit, with permits being either granted for free or
having to be bought (via auction or on the market). The market price of permits will
reflect their relative scarcity (the extent to which the existing level of emissions exceeds
the total level of emissions for which permits have been issued). The higher the price of
permits, the stronger the incentive on polluters to reduce their emissions. Ultimately,
economic theory tells us, all emitters will try to reduce their emissions to a level where
the marginal costs of doing so equal the benefits. In this way, the collective reduction of
emissions is achieved most efficiently, as all polluters reduce their emissions at rates
reflecting the differences in costs and benefits associated with reduction.1
The idea of applying the notion of a tradable permit system to global CO2 emissions
emerged in the late 1980s. It was first raised in 1989 in a study commissioned by the
Ministry for the Environment in New Zealand (Bertram, et al., 1990) and subsequently
caught the attention of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and
other analysts (Grubb, 1989). Since then, its popularity has grown among governments
and industries, especially with the increase in concern about global warming and the
build-up of pressure for more effective action. As the costs of reducing carbon dioxide
emissions varies across industries, sectors and nations, a tradable emissions scheme for
such emissions seems more attractive than blanket regulation based on standard
requirements across economies. Another option, a globally agreed carbon tax, offers less
certainty in terms of achieving a desired level of emissions reduction, takes away money
from people when they need it most, and cannot provide the steady signal that is
required for meeting long-term policy objectives (Fleming, 2007: 33).
In recent years, interest in emissions trading has grown considerably. To meet their
emissions reduction targets under the Kyoto agreement, a growing number of countries,
including Denmark, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, have adopted proposals
for putting in place greenhouse gas emissions trading systems. By 2003, some 47 carbon
trading schemes had been introduced, most of which in Europe (Hasselknippe, 2003). In
2005, interest in emissions trading was boosted significantly with the entry into force of
the Kyoto Protocol, and when a trading scheme became operative at the EU level (Dunn
4and Flavin, 2002; Euraktiv, 2005). It has been noted that, based on current emissions
projections, countries that have signed up to Kyoto will be relying heavily on these
trading mechanism to meet their commitments (OECD/IEA, 2005: 64).
Although emissions trading scheme have become more popular, they are not without
issues. Evaluations have pointed out a mixed bag of results regarding their environmental
effectiveness and efficiency gains (Hahn, 1995; Tietenberg, 1992b; 2003). A wide range
of issues and obstacles to their ‘optimal’ functioning in line with the expectations
promised by economic theory have been identified, including gaps in information,
transparency, monitoring and verification, insufficient or wrong incentives, low prices
and/or uncertainty about the long-term price of carbon, and high transaction costs, and
inadequate monitoring and enforcement (Tietenberg, 1992b; 2003). Many of these
problems can be regarded as design issues that may well be reduced or resolved with
time and experience. However, some are fundamentally political and relate to the
preponderant role of governments, more or less influenced by vested interests, in the
design and implementation of such schemes. There will always be a discrepancy between
the optimal models designed in economic theory and ‘really existing’ models, among
other, because political rationality leads governments to grant concessions to powerful
interest groups. Moreover, in plain terms, parties often have strong incentives and plenty
of opportunities for cheating (Davies, 2007; Davies and Adam, 2007; Lipow, 2007). All
these problems, and past records, cast doubt on the claim that emissions trading schemes
and other tradable permit schemes are indeed more efficient, effective and cost-effective
in tackling environmental problems than more traditional forms of regulation (Lipow,
2007).
Doubts about emissions trading are not just fed by discrepancies between their
theoretical economic advantages and performance in practice. They are also based on
social and ethical concerns. The (relative) merits of tradable permits schemes should not
be judged solely or even primarily on economic (efficiency) grounds. Political, social and
ethical considerations have a significant role to play in their adoption or rejection, even if
the economic advantages of such instruments can be demonstrated. Some have argued
that the use of economic instruments to address pollution, for instance, is inherently
unethical, as they fail to stigmatise and punish behaviour that knowingly harms people
and the environment (Kelman, 1981), and that this can be compared to the medieval
practice of selling indulgences by the Catholic Church (Goodin, 1994). However, other
policy instruments are not necessarily less problematic in this respect.2 The argument
advanced here is that the merits and demerits of tradable permit schemes need to be
assessed more broadly, to include social, and political as well as economic and ethical
5issues. Whether emissions trading, or for that matter any other tradable permit scheme is
desirable, it can be argued, depends in large part on whether their ethical, social, and
political advantages as well as their environmental effectiveness and economic benefits,
compared to other approaches, can be convincingly demonstrated. To a large extent,
these merits depend on the design of these instruments, including to whom entitlements are
allocated and how they are distributed.
Allocation and distribution
Here, the term allocation will be used to refer to whom emission entitlements (or
pollution permits) are granted (whether for free or for a price), while distribution refers
to how much holders of such rights are allocated and to the spread or concentration of
emission rights, also as the result of trading.3 Although interrelated, these issues also raise
different questions. Obviously, allocation affects distribution (as those who are not
entitled to permits do not receive any), but permits can be distributed more or less
equally among those who are entitled. Who is entitled is the primary question; how
entitlements should be distributed depends on how that question is answered as well as
other considerations.
Both questions are fundamentally ethical and political. In economic theory, it does not
matter how entitlements are allocated, as different forms of allocation are cost-effective
as long as permits are distributed in a way that all holders are ‘price-takers’, transaction
costs are low, and entitlements are fully transferable (Tietenberg, 1992a: 129; 2003: 401,
410-412). Economically, there are no compelling reasons for allocating rights to the poor
rather than to the rich, or to emitters rather than to those affected by emissions. From an
economic point of view, the distribution of entitlements is of concern only to the extent
that their concentration would result in holders being able to use their (monopoly,
oligopoly) position to influence price and trading. This does not mean that tradable
permit schemes cannot be used to address equity issues. As Tietenberg notes: “…the
initial allocation can be used to pursue fairness goals without lowering the value of the
resource” (Tietenberg, 2003: 411), but this simply has been avoided. From an ethical and
political point of view, however, allocation and distribution issues, also with regard to
GHG emission entitlements, are highly significant.
Allocating emission entitlements to all people en an equal per capita basis has been justified
on the basis of the simple moral principle “that every human being has an equal right to
use the atmospheric resource” (Grubb, 1989: 37). That all people should have an equal
right to such a vital resource for human life as the atmosphere is a principle also
6underwritten by those who advocate an ‘environmental space’ (ES) approach. The ES
approach is based on three main tenets: the existence of environmental limits, the linkage
between environmental limits and resource consumption (‘throughput’), and sharing
environmental space on a per capita basis (Bührs, 2004; Carley and Spapens, 1998; Hille,
1997; Sachs, et al., 1998).
The ‘Contraction and Convergence’ (C&C) approach, which also assigns, in principle, an
equal per capita ‘right’ to GHG emissions to all people, and expects emissions of all
countries to converge to that level by a set date, can be seen as an application of the ES
approach. (Kuntsi-Reunanen and Luukkanen, 2006; Meyer, 2000; Najam, et al., 2003;
Pearce, 2003). Although initially dismissed as idealistic, there are signs that its political
acceptability is growing, in part because there seems to be no other way to bring
countries like China and India into the fold of a global climate change regime. Many
political and business leaders, including the German Chancellor Angela Merkel, have
expressed support for the adoption of a global agreement based on the Contraction and
Convergence model, recognising that, in global political terms, it is the most realistic
basis for forging international consensus on a post-Kyoto climate change agreement
(Global Commons Institute, 2008; Spiegel Online International, 2007).
However, although distributing emission entitlements on an equal per capita basis is often
regarded as the most just solution, it is not unproblematic (Starkey, 2008). For a start, it
does not take the fact, referred to above, that historically high-income countries are
responsible for the larger part of such emissions4, and that the people in those countries
have benefited from this in the form of economic development and higher standards of
living. As GHG emissions are closely intertwined with ‘development’, low-income
countries arguably should receive greater entitlements than high-income countries
(‘developmental equity’). On the other hand, it can be argued that people living in colder
climates (many of which are high-income countries) have a greater need for energy
sources to keep warm compared to people in warmer regions. Who has a right to what
has been the subject of a long-standing philosophical debate between often conflicting
schools of thought, a debate which is unlikely to lead to consensus or agreement on the
notion of justice, including environmental justice, especially in an international context,
any time soon (Beitz, 1999; Caney, 2002; Dobson, 1998; Miller, 1999; Page, 2006; Rawls,
1999; Rose, 1992; Starkey, 2008).
Given these differences and complexities, it is perhaps not surprising that many of those
involved in the debate about the allocation and distribution of GHG emission
entitlements adopt the basis of the Equal Per Capita Allocation (EPCA) principle,5 as
7Starkey notes (Starkey, 2008: 5, 9-12). Thus, although not everyone agrees with the
EPCA principle, its simplicity seems to hold growing appeal internationally, if not for
pragmatic and political reasons.
But distributing emission entitlements to countries on a per capita basis and then leaving it
to national governments to further allocate and distribute them within their countries
does not necessarily (or at all) guarantee an equitable allocation and/or a reduction of
inequality. It is here that the difference between distribution and allocation becomes
really important. The question to whom emission rights should be allocated is
compounded by the confusion between individuals and states when it comes to
distributional justice (Beckerman and Pasek, 1995). In much of the literature about
tradable emissions permits it seems to be taken for granted that permits will be allocated
to national governments (states), at least initially, who then allocate them within their
countries. The most common practice in the GHG trading schemes that have been
adopted by governments is to allocate entitlements to the principal emitters, based on
past emissions records (the ‘grandfathering’ principle) (Hasselknippe, 2003; OECD/IEA,
2005: 25-27, 121-122). The main reason for this is political-economic: introducing
tradable permit schemes based on this principle is economically neutral, or even
lucrative, to the main, affected industries, and thereby enhances their political
acceptability and feasibility.
Although, in first instance, it may seem reasonable to allocate emission entitlements to
those who ‘need’ (to obtain) them, this raises serious objections. First, it implies
showering them with significant ‘windfall profits’, given the considerable market value of
entitlements, especially if granted for free (OECD/IEA, 2005: 27). Second, it is ethically
dubious, to say the least, to effectively reward those who are responsible for causing the
(pollution) problem, and for harming environmental (including human) well-being. It can
be rightly questioned why polluters should be rewarded for “having invested in
environmentally damaging activities?” (Bertram, 1992: 437-438; Bertram, et al., 1990: 14).
Third, allocating entitlements to (mostly large) emitters and allowing these to be traded
without restrictions may create (or reinforce) monopoly power, and contributes to
increasing disparities in wealth and power within countries as well as between countries.
The introduction of GHG emissions schemes has been accompanied by the creation of a
new range of investment opportunities, including speculation in derivatives (Chicago
Climate Exchange; European Climate Exchange; Klaassen, et al., 2005; Korppoo, 2003),
creating “a convergence of capital and environmental markets” (Financial Times, London,
4 November 1999, quoted in Sinai, 2001). Carbon trading schemes have been
characterised by critics as just another form of privatisation and appropriation of the
8commons, profit making and increasing inequality, and constituting ‘carbon colonialism’
(Bachram, 2004; Pearce, 2008).
However, these objections against carbon trading schemes are no reason for dismissing
them altogether. Rather, they emphasise the need for designing schemes in ways that take
into account ethical, social and political considerations. It is possible to design carbon
trading schemes that reduce inequality, and that benefit the poor and communities rather
than the rich, and that strengthen the economic basis of democracy. The key, I will
argue, lies in allocating entitlements to individuals but to manage these entitlements at
the community level.
The more logical step following on from distributing emission entitlement over countries
on a per capita basis, especially if this is done on equity grounds, is to also allocate such
permits to individuals. If entitlements are distributed between countries on the basis of
the argument that all people have an equal right to the use of, or benefits provided by,
the atmospheric commons, it seems odd to then allocate those rights to only some people
within countries. Recently, the idea of granting emission entitlements to individuals has
been taken up by advocates of domestic tradable permit schemes - DTQs (Fleming,
2007; Starkey and Anderson, 2005; The Foundation for the Economics of Sustainability
(Feasta), 2008). DTQs assign a proportion of emission entitlements, for free, to
individuals (be it only adults) on an equal per capita basis. Emissions that can be attributed
directly to energy use by individuals (in the UK, some 40 per cent), are covered by
individual entitlements, while the remainder is tendered to business and government
organisations (Fleming, 2007: 9-10). Such a scheme would have the advantage that the
costs of reducing emissions would be borne largely by the main energy users (emitters)
and by those individuals who exceed their quota, while sparing those on low incomes
and offering an incentive to all energy users to minimise their emissions. Although the
idea has drawn criticism for being overly complex (Graham, 2004) and DTQs carry
higher set-up and running costs than alternative approaches to reducing emissions, they
seem technically feasible (Starkey and Anderson, 2005: 2, 31-35).
However, for several reasons, it is preferable to design a scheme that, although formally
allocating entitlements (for free) to individuals, does not involve trade by individuals. The
reasons relate to efficiency, the collective nature of the emissions reduction challenge, equity
considerations, and the potential advantages of managing entitlements collectively rather
than individually.
9As already noted above, the transaction costs associated with an emissions trading
scheme involving millions of individuals are significant, diminishing their efficiency.
Although it has been argued that the higher costs of such schemes are offset by their less
tangible benefits, such as involving all people in the challenge of, and responsibility for,
controlling emissions, this argument is not very convincing, for the reasons explained
below (Starkey and Anderson, 2005: 35).
Involving individuals in trading emission entitlements may be seen a means of involving
them in a common purpose, but it also individualises the challenge. Sure, individuals, as
consumers, can do quite a few things to mitigate or reduce their energy use and
emissions, but we cannot depend on such choices for bringing about the infrastructural
and systemic changes that are required to make our production, consumption, transport
and energy systems (among other) sustainable. For instance, some people may choose to
install solar hot water systems, to buy ‘green’ electricity, to live close to their work, or to
use public transport, but the adoption of such solutions by all or even most people (or
even making them available to many) requires decisions, and significant expenditure, at
the collective level.
Also, it seems doubtful that allowing individuals to trade entitlements would make
people feel part of this common challenge. It may just as well reinforce the prevailing
emphasis on individual responsibility and approaches, with individual gain (personal
cost-benefit rationality) as the main driver for reducing emissions. Moreover, when
individuals benefit from trade, it is quite possible that they will not invest their gains into
further reducing their energy use or emissions, but on consumptive purposes. To really
involve individuals in the challenge of reducing emissions requires an approach that
conceives of individuals as persons in community, a view that sees human beings as
constituted by (the quality of) their relationships and that acknowledges their mutual
interdependence (Daly, et al., 1989: 159-175).6 The welfare of each depends very much
on that of the community as a whole, and vice versa. This applies a fortiori to the issue of
climate change, which requires the building or strengthening of collective capacity to deal
with sources and (potential) effects on communities as well as individuals. Such a view
also implies adopting approaches and seeking solutions that involve people as citizens
rather than as consumers.
Allocating entitlements to individuals also does not imply reducing inequality, as both rich
and poor would qualify for equal entitlements. Although the marginal value such permits
would be greater to the poor than to the rich, ultimately the rich would stand to gain
most from allocating entitlements to individuals, especially if trading (and speculation) in
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permits is allowed. Chances are that the poor would sell whatever they can of their
entitlements as they desperately need income to meet their daily needs (Martinez-Alier,
1993; Martinez-Alier, 2002), while the rich can continue their unsustainable lifestyles by
simply buying additional entitlements, and might be able to generate potentially big
profits from trading large volumes of permits on the market.
The approach favoured here is to allocate formally emission entitlements to all
individuals, but to assign responsibility for the management of these entitlements,
bundled on a geographical or community basis, to community organisations. Apart from
being more equitable than allocating emission entitlements to the major emitters, this
also has the potential to promote sustainable development. How such a scheme would
work and can deliver this potential, I will discuss in the following section.
GHG emission entitlements and sustainable development
The idea advanced here is that of a scheme that allocates emission entitlements (for free)
to individuals, but in which their management occurs, on a community level, by specially
designated bodies, referred to here as Community Carbon Trusts (CCTs). Assigning
responsibility for the management (including trade) of entitlements to a community
organisation is advocated not just to reduce transaction costs; it is also more in line with
the collective nature of the challenge posed by climate change, and has the potential to
strengthen the capacity of communities to deal with this challenge, which needs to be
seen in the broader context of the need for sustainable development. Giving the
responsibility for the management of entitlements to specially designated community
bodies rather than general local/regional government organisations also helps to ensure
that spending of the revenue from the trading of entitlements is focused on the ultimate
objective of reducing emissions and advancing sustainability.
In line with the C&C and ES approaches, the scheme proposed here starts with
determining the maximum allowable level of global GHG emissions. This would be
divided by the world population, giving the per capita amount of GHG (environmental)
‘space’ and entitlement. This space would be distributed across countries based on
population numbers, determining each country’s ultimate quota.7 Within countries,
GHG entitlements are then distributed by national governments over newly created
community organisations (CCTs), with each CCT representing a geographical area that is
considered socially and environmentally appropriate.8 Initial emission entitlements are
based on existing levels of emissions and population (in line with the C&C approach),
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but are reduced gradually and steadily (every year or every few years) to reach their
ultimate quota by the target year.
Globally agreed designated sources of emissions (companies, organisations, sectors) in all
countries must buy emission permits, either from CCTs in their own countries, or on the
international market. Carbon banks could act as intermediaries to facilitate trade and
reduce transaction costs.9. Trading, then, would occur between the major (‘upstream’)
emitters, CCTs, and carbon banks. As the amount of available permits gradually
contracts, the price of permits rises over time, providing an incentive to emitters to
reduce their emissions in the most cost-effective way (so that the marginal costs equal
the marginal benefits). Emitters that are not able to reduce emissions will see a
continuing increase in the costs of covering their emissions, which will be incorporated
into the prices of their goods and services, making these relatively more expensive than
less carbon intensive alternatives (such as renewable energy resources compared to fossil
fuels). Thus, the incentive to reduce or contain emissions becomes stronger over time.10
The main difference between the proposed scheme and that like the EU’s ETS is that
entitlements are not allocated to the major emitters, but to community organisations
(formally, to all ‘individuals-in-community’). The major differences with the DTQs
referred to above is that entitlements are not traded by individuals, and that the revenues
from trading flow to CCTs rather than individuals. Another difference between DTQs
and the scheme proposed here is that the latter allows trading to occur internationally,
which is not just important from the point of view of enhancing efficiency (Hepburn and
Stern, 2008: 271; Tietenberg, 1992b: 50), but a necessity for the scheme proposed here to
balance supply and demand. As most of the major emitters (and thus demand for
entitlements) are found in high-income countries, but most entitlements would be owned
by people in low-income countries (given their larger populations), confining trade
within national borders would significantly hamper the opportunities for trade.
Apart from equity considerations, arguably an equally important rationale for adopting
the scheme proposed here is that the flow of income that is expected to be derived from
selling entitlements by CCTs will significantly strengthen their capacity to deal with the
challenges posed by climate change. However, to ensure that this will be the case, two
conditions must be met. First, emission rights must be made inalienable in the sense that
they cannot be sold indefinitely by CCTs (on behalf of their members), but only on an
annual basis. This to avoid that entitlements accumulate in a few hands and increase
inequality, as new monopolies are created that only serve their own narrow economic
interests (Grubb, 1989: 34), and also to minimise the scope for speculation (which
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contributes to price instability and adversely affects investment decisions). Second, the
revenue derived from entitlements can only be spent on programmes and projects that
reduce emissions (mitigation) and/or that assist communities to cope with the effects of
climate change (adaptation).11 The obvious reason for this is to avoid that revenues are
spent on projects or measures that increase GHG emissions (such as road building).
This condition is a practical application of the idea that the currency by which
entitlements are traded should be in the form of projects or measures that contribute to
carbon abatement and/or enhancing energy conservation and efficiency (Grubb, 1989:
35).12
The importance of strengthening local capacity for promoting sustainable development
widely recognised in the environmental movement and in the literature on sustainable
development (Adams, 1990; DeWitt and Mlay, 1999; Durning, 1989; Meadowcroft, 2004;
Seyfang and Smith, 2007), while the significance of the role of local government and
community-based action is increasingly recognised in the context of combating climate
change. Local governments are no longer simply implementers of national policy and
have developed approaches of their own (Bulkeley and Betsill, 2005; Bulkeley and Moser,
2007). These developments are most pronounced in the United States, where the failure
of the federal government to take forceful action has provoked a raft of initiatives aimed
at combating climate change at the state and local level, and where municipalities are said
to be leading the way (Kousky and Schneider, 2003). In several European countries,
many local governments have seriously engaged with Agenda 21, sometimes with the
support from the national level (Lafferty, 2001). In these matters, local governments
have also become an international actor in their own right through international
organisation and programmes, such as ICLEI and the International Cities for Climate
Protection Programme (ICLEI, 2007).
Although these developments should not be idealised, and local governments and
communities are limited in their willingness and capacity to embrace sustainable
development and issues like climate change, their significance should also not be
dismissed or underestimated (Kousky and Schneider, 2003). Given their key role in urban
and regional planning, housing and transport, local governments have a big role to play
in advancing sustainability, but are often hampered in doing so by insufficient funding.
As combating climate change is now an inevitable and necessary condition for advancing
sustainability, requiring the (re-)development of environmentally sustainable urban,
energy, transport and other infrastructures and systems, especially at local and regional
levels, the transfer of income from emissions trade to this level of government boost the
means for sustainable development. It is also badly needed, given the shortage of cash of
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many local/regional authorities and the enormous expense required for the development
of sustainable infrastructures. An emissions trading scheme like the one proposed here
provides the basis for a considerable income flow to local government. It increases the
capacity for exploiting the potential synergies between the sustainable development
agenda and the need to address climate change, especially at the local level (Wilbanks,
2003).
However, local governments are not inherently inclined to support sustainable
development, and are also prone to being captured by particularistic, short-term, and
vested interests. To prevent that, as a result of ‘politics as usual’, the income flow from
emissions trading is spent by local governments on projects that increase rather than
decrease emissions, it seems best to assign the management of these revenues to
separate, independent bodies (CCTs). These bodies should be given the mandate to
sponsor only projects and measures that reduce GHG emissions and/or that enhance
the capacity of communities to adapt to climate change, and that are environmentally
sustainable. Thus, CCTs would be able to influence decision-making by local
governments, generally operating under considerable financial constraints, towards the
development and maintenance of infrastructure that enhances sustainability. The scheme
proposed here does not presume that all local/regional governments take environmental
causes seriously, let alone consider these a priority. But tempting them with a
considerable pool of money will certainly help.
Thus, the global emissions trading scheme proposed here is not only more equitable than
those commonly advanced (based on the ‘grandfathering principle’ for the allocation of
entitlements), but has also the potential to significantly strengthen local capacity for
tackling climate change and advancing sustainable development. Moreover, it may also
help to advance local democracy, as I will discuss in the next section.
GHG emission entitlements, politics and democracy
The management of GHG emission entitlements to CCTs as the representatives of
‘individuals-in-community’ not only has the potential to promote sustainable
development, but also to enhance the involvement of people in decision making. On the
condition that certain institutional arrangements are put in place, such a scheme is likely
to enhance democracy of the direct (deliberative, participatory) as well as the indirect
(representative) kind.
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It is sometimes argued that a reliance on economic instruments in public policy is
detrimental to democracy of the deliberative or participatory kind. Such instruments, in
particular those of a property rights nature, are said to diminish opportunities for public
input and deliberation, and help to “establish more firmly an economically rationalistic
world, one populated by homo economicus rather than homo civicus”. “Homo civicus is not good
for democracy”. By contrast, although a reliance on regulation is sometimes referred to
as a ‘command-and-control’ approach, it is seen as more likely to provide opportunities
for public debate (Dryzek, 1995: 305-307).
This argument overlooks two important things. First, that market instruments themselves
require regulation, for their establishment as well as their continued functioning. This is
true for markets of all kinds, but even more so for ‘quasi-markets’ created in the realm of
public goods, such as air quality. Foremost, such markets are created for the specific
purpose of achieving particular environmental objectives, such as a reduction of
pollution levels, at lower cost than via alternative means. The allocation of entitlements
and obligations with regard to public goods is likely to arouse considerable public
deliberation about goals, objectives and targets, as well as on institutional arrangements,
implementation, enforcement, and performance. Thus, the establishment of a market for
GHG emission entitlements invariably gives rise to (ongoing) public deliberation on
these matters, perhaps even more so than if more traditional policy instruments are relied
upon (such as standards or a ‘Best Practicable/Technical Means’ approach).
A second, and perhaps more fundamental, reason why market instruments, and in
particular the allocation of GHG emission entitlements, have the potential of enhancing
and not diminishing democracy is that they may help to strengthen the economic basis for
democracy. As already noted above, distributing entitlements globally on a per capita basis
would amount to considerable global redistribution of wealth, given the present inverse
relationship between population size and income in the world. Inasmuch as democratic
political systems require a minimum economic basis, such a transfer may assist in this
respect. Moreover, allocating entitlements to CCTs strengthens the economic basis of
communities and local governments in poor and rich countries alike, and is likely to
enhance public interest in how revenues are spent, especially as these can be used for
causes from which potentially also individuals benefit, such as the development of
community-owned renewable energy sources, enhancing energy efficiency, and improved
and low-cost public transport.
Although, for reasons discussed above, there is a need to lay down (internationally or
globally) certain rules regarding the mandates and operations of CCTs, the decisions and
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operations of these bodies are likely to become the subject of considerable public
deliberation. All people living within area covered by a CCT are formally or legally
members of the Trust. Trustees are accountable to (and elected by) the members of the
Trust, and all members will have an opportunity to contribute to the debate about what
programmes and projects (aimed at mitigating and/or adapting to climate change, based
on sustainability principles) to spend the revenue from selling their emission entitlements
on. The needs and preferences of, and within, rural and urban communities may differ,
and a community’s priorities in these areas are likely to change over time. In other words,
it is important that the diversity of needs and preferences can be expressed through the
decision-making processes by which it is decided how the revenues are to be used within
the general constraints specified above.
The management of GHG emission entitlements by communities may help to enhance
democracy also in other ways. It is likely to strengthen the position of local government
vis-á-vis central government, in particular in the all-important area of energy policy and
management. Presently, energy policy is largely determined by central governments,
influenced by big (private or semi-public/private) companies that emphasise and profit
from large scale forms of energy generation beyond the control of communities.
Enhancing the capacity of communities to develop their own forms of energy generation
and management, tilts the ‘playing field’ of the market, at least to some extent, back
towards communities, and creates a political-economic basis from which they can build
an environmentally sustainable physical and energy infrastructure. Perhaps most
importantly, granting emission rights to ‘individuals-in-community’ can help build or
restore people’s collective sense of being able to influence their own future, instead of
being controlled and manipulated by the anonymous forces of ‘the market’ and
technological development, as described by Ulrich Beck in the “Risk Society” (Beck,
1992).
To ensure that CCTs are and remain responsive to the views, interests and needs of the
community that they represent, it is desirable that their Board members are elected by the
communities on a regular basis. For the sake of continuity and promoting a longer-term
perspective, one third of the Board members could be elected every five years. However,
this is not the place to fill in the details of the rules and arrangements by which CCTs
operate, also because this is best left to a process of discursive design at the community
level. The notion and experience of (especially local) democracy is likely to take on
greater meaning if people are able to link substantive outcomes to collective choices.
Again, this is not to idealise local government or to denigrate the importance of nation-
states and national governments. All levels of government and governance have crucial
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roles to play in addressing climate change and other environmental issues. In the
prevailing global political-economic system, there is a need for strengthening the
collective capacity to deal with these issues at all levels. What is argued here is that it is
possible to design a global tradable permit scheme for greenhouse gas emissions that is
equitable, that strengthens the capacity of communities, and that enhances public
influence on vital decisions that affect communities and the environment.
Even though the potential advantages of introducing a system of tradable emission rights
along the lines suggested may be apparent, to what extent is it politically feasible? It
could be argued that local or regional governments in many, especially low income,
countries do not have the means to manage the emission entitlements for the citizens in
their area (Baumert, et al., 2003). Although weak local/regional government capacity is no
doubt a problem in many countries, the scheme proposed here is aimed specifically at
boosting that capacity. However, as corruption can be a serious problem also at this
level, it seems desirable to assign the management of revenues from the sale of
entitlements to specialised bodies (CCTs) that operate independently to internationally
agreed standards. The common elements required for the proper functioning of such
bodies (their mandates and rules related to trade and the spending of revenue) suggest
the need for designating an international organisation that assists in the creation and
operation of CCTs, and that audits their performance. Funding for these purposes could
come from a small levy on the trade of emission entitlements. Moreover, it could be
agreed internationally that some of this revenue is made available to national
governments that have inadequate monitoring, reporting and enforcement capacity,
which is another essential requirement for the effectiveness of any global tradable permit
scheme or, for that matter, any international regime or regulation.
No doubt the strongest opposition to the adoption of a scheme like the one proposed
here will come from those parties that stand to lose the significant gains potentially
associated with the allocation of entitlements based on the ‘grandfathering’ principle.
Allocating emission entitlements to communities rather than businesses does not in itself
change the cost structure of reducing emissions. The ‘loss’ incurred by business from an
allocation of entitlements to communities relates primarily to the unearned and
undeserved profits that stand to gain if such entitlements are granted to them. It is the
outlook on considerable ‘windfall profits’ that makes tradable emissions proposals
acceptable and attractive to many businesses. Allocating emission entitlements to
communities eliminates this prospect and therefore can be expected to lead to
diminished support for, and increased opposition to such a scheme in business circles.
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As noted above, the adoption of the ‘grandfathering’ principle as the basis for the
allocation of emission entitlements can be explained foremost on its acceptability to
major businesses, and to the fact that the business sector occupies a privileged position
within many political systems. But this is no reason for readily dismissing alternatives as
‘unrealistic’. The privileged position of business in democratic systems should not be
taken as a ‘given’, but should be seen as problematic and contestable from a democratic
perspective (Dahl, 1985; Lindblom, 1977; Polanyi, 1944). Rather than further
strengthening the position of businesses by giving them rights to collective goods, we
should identify and adopt ways to ‘re-embed’ economic interests within the socio-
political structures of societies. Formally assigning emission entitlements to CCTs gives
citizens more control over infrastructural development and helps to counter the trend
towards the increased concentration of economic power that also translates into political
power.
Even from a politically or economically ‘realistic’ point of view, allocating emission
entitlements to communities cannot be simply dismissed as idealistic. Proponents of
tradable permit schemes also often refer to the option of making businesses pay for
entitlements, for instance, by auctioning them (Fleming, 2007). Schemes may start off on
the basis of the ‘grandfathering’ principle, but the possibility or even likelihood of
gradually introducing auctioning for a growing proportion of emission entitlements is
often referred to as a realistic option (Stavins, 2008). Initially, ‘grandfathering’ may be
needed to overcome the opposition to the adoption of such schemes, but once they are
in place, governments may well be inclined to gradually introduce auctioning as a means
of generating revenue enabling them to finance the significant costs associated with the
development of sustainable infrastructures needed to move towards ‘carbon neutral’
economies. Similarly, there is no reason why, even after GHG entitlements have been
given initially to businesses, they cannot be gradually transferred from businesses towards
communities instead of being auctioned.
Of course, to the extent that businesses accept the challenges posed by sustainable
development, they may benefit, too. A growing number of businesses involved in selling
services, projects and technologies that reduce GHG emissions stands to gain from the
increased demand for these things from communities. The scope for expansion of such
industries is enormous, and arguably represents a new frontier or stage in the eco-
industrial revolution that has only just begun.
But the real ‘winners’ of the scheme proposed here will be communities. Significant
tangible and intangible benefits can be expected to flow from the greening of urban,
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energy and transport infrastructures, enabled by the expected boost in financial capacity
of communities. This, in turn, will strengthen the capacity of communities to adapt to the
already inevitable effects of climate change and to deal with other environmental
challenges. Moreover, such a scheme may help stimulate public debate in communities
about their own future, enhancing democracy as well as the sense of community and
citizenship.
In the end, whether emission entitlements are allocated to businesses or communities is a
political decision influenced by the relative power and influence of the various parties
and interests involved. To bolster the case for community entitlements, communities
themselves will need to embrace the idea. Environmental and citizens’ groups will need
to push hard for its acceptance by governments. Eco-businesses need to lobby
governments and bring home the fact that, in the medium to long-term, there are likely
to be more economic winners than losers from the necessary greening of infrastructures.
But such pressure should not even be necessary to convince governments of the benefits
of a system that enhances the capacity of communities, and therefore nations, to deal
with climate change and to develop sustainable infrastructures, and that diminishes the
dependence on mostly foreign controlled supplies of energy and other resources that are
steadily being depleted. Supporting such a course is also likely to strengthen the political
legitimacy and stability of governments. The need to reduce GHG emissions provides
not only an opportunity for sharing environmental space equitably and sustainably, but
also for displaying political vision and quality of leadership.
Conclusion
In recent years, the idea of establishing a global GHG emissions trading system initially
advocated mostly by economists, has been gaining support among environmental
advocates, businesses and governments. Much of this growing support is based on the
perceived economic advantages of such a scheme, which offers governments and
businesses opportunities to reduce GHG emissions in the most cost-effective way.
Moreover, as granting emission entitlements to emitters based on past emission records
(‘grandfathering’) has become the most commonly adopted basis for allocating emission
entitlements, many businesses stand to gain considerably from the adoption of such a
scheme. However, allocating entitlements to emitters (polluters) does nothing to reduce
inequity within countries; on the contrary, it is likely to contribute to a widening of the
gap between rich and poor, the powerful and the powerless. More generally, advocates of
emissions trading schemes tend to focus mainly on claimed economic benefits and
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ignore the ethical, social, and political issues associated with the design of such schemes,
in particular with regard to whom emission entitlements are allocated. This neglect, even
if the claimed economic advantages can be achieved, significantly weakens the case for
such schemes, possibly to the point that their disadvantages outweigh their potential
benefits.
This paper has explored a design of a global GHG tradable permit scheme that is
economically efficient, environmentally effective, and ethically, socially and politically
acceptable or even attractive to most people. Allocating entitlements to all people on a
per capita basis, in line with the principles advocated by the environmental space and C&C
approaches, and combining this with institutional arrangements that assign responsibility
for the management of entitlements to local/regional organisations that represent
‘individuals-in-community’, has the potential to boost communities’ capacity to mitigate
and adapt to climate change by supporting development, that is environmentally
sustainable and equitable, and that also enhances democracy, in particular by
strengthening the economic basis of local government and by promoting public
involvement in collective decision-making.
The scheme proposed here is simple in broad outline. It recognises the ecological
imperative of reducing anthropogenic GHG emissions. It notionally allocates the
environmental (GHG) ‘space’ to all humans in the world on a per capita basis, as a
(gradually diminishing) quantity of inalienable emission entitlements. It requires the
development of fairly straightforward institutional arrangements for these entitlements to
be managed by specialised, independent community organisations (CCTs) on behalf of
the ‘individuals-in-community’ within their areas. Like all tradable permit schemes, it
requires the creation of a national framework for registering and monitoring emissions
and trade, and the enforcement of rights and obligations.
Although such a scheme can expect strong opposition from businesses that stand to lose
the unearned profits from the allocation of emissions based on the ‘grandfathering’
principle, the benefits to societies and the world as a whole are much more significant.
One would hope and think that this will be sufficient reason for such a proposal to be
embraced by political leaders who claim to be committed to advancing the interests of
citizens.
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1 It should be noted that under most schemes, emitters who reduce emissions below the level to which they
are ‘entitled’ (hold permits), can sell their ‘surplus’ permits on the market, thus providing an additional
incentive for reducing emissions. However, for reasons explained below, allowing polluters to profit from
their pollution record is ethically problematic. It is also not needed to achieve optimal efficiency as, in
economic theory, all polluters will reduce their emissions to a level where the marginal costs equal the
marginal benefits.
2 For instance, setting standards raises issues regarding what are ‘acceptable’ levels of pollution, harm or
risk, and usually implies allowing some pollution to occur without (financial or other) constraints. Banning
all pollution avoids this problem, but could cause other adverse (social, economic) effects (such as
unemployment), and is in many cases, like in the case of CO2 emissions, not practicable within reason.
Tradable permit schemes potentially can be as strict as standards in the (overall) level of pollution that they
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allow, and over time that level can be further reduced and ultimately set at zero, implying the phasing out
of tradable permits.
3 It is important to be clear on these terms, as sometimes the term distribution is used to refer to what I call
here allocation, while the term allocation is used for usage, for instance with regard to resources (De Jonge,
et al., 2001: 31-32).
4 High income (‘developed’) countries are estimated to be responsible for approximately 71 percent of
historical/cumulative emissions of GHG emissions from the mid-1850s (Baumert, et al., 2005)
5 This is sometimes referred to as the Equal Per Capita Allocation (EPCA) principle, it may be more
appropriate to refer to the Equal Per Capita Distribution (EPCD) principle, as in most (proposed) schemes
entitlements are not allocated to individuals.
6 In this paper, I use the expression ‘individuals-in-community’ rather than ‘persons-in-community’ to make
explicit the link with the literature and debate on individual entitlements.
7 To provide an incentive against stimulating of population growth as a basis for the distribution of
entitlements, the population levels used for the scheme could be ‘frozen’ at existing levels or based on
projected growth levels by 2050, or a mix between the two. The former would be detrimental to many low-
income countries where population growth in the coming decades seems inevitable for demographic
reasons. Taking the projected population levels by 2050 does not necessarily imply support for population
growth as countries that manage to keep their population significantly below the projected levels end up
having more ‘emission space’ per capita than the global average that can be used to the advantage of a
smaller population. .
8 What this means is open for debate, and for national governments to decide, although international rules
or guidelines could be developed and adopted. CCTs could comprise cities comprising millions of people,
or large areas with a relatively small population. In determining their size, consideration might be given to
the differences in how regions are affected by climate change, the capacity required dealing with climate
mitigation and adaptation (including vital infrastructure changes), populations size (determining the income
likely to be derived from emission entitlements), social and political affinity or cohesion, the minimization
of corruption, and other).
9 Rules could be adopted to prevent or constrain speculative trade (and profits) in entitlements and their
accumulation by institutions, for instance, by levying a tax on trade and by setting limits on the amount of
‘banking’ and ‘borrowing’ by the end users of the entitlements, even though allowing a degree of such
practices may be desirable to promote temporal efficiency (Tietenberg, 2003: 413).
10 It should be noted that under the proposed scheme global equality would be achieved with regard to
emission entitlements and the benefits derived from those (as the market functions as a great equalizer in
terms of the price of permits), but not with regard to the location of emissions, as some more energy-
intensive industries are likely to continue to be concentrated in some countries, depending on geographical
and other factors that create comparative advantage. It would be practically unrealistic and even unfeasible
to expect that ‘real life’ emissions could be distributed equally (on a per capita basis) over all countries, and
thus to require countries to bring their emissions to such levels.
11 It is of course almost inevitable that uses of such revenues, even if spent on environmentally positive
causes, such improving public transport and building community-owned renewable energy projects, bring
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about an initial increase in emissions. The important thing is that uses also lead to reductions that (more
than) offset the emissions associated with these investments, sooner rather than later, and surely over the
lifespan of such investments. Additionally, as GHG emissions reduction is only one of the environmental
challenges associated with the existence of environmental limits, such investments can and should also be
made to meet environmental sustainability criteria, so that they do not simply shift environmental pressures
and problems elsewhere.
12 One issue that would need to be addressed, too, is whether and to what extent the expansion (or even
retention) of carbon sinks adds to the entitlements of communities or countries (and vice versa, their
destruction to a decrease of entitlements). Limitations of space do not make it possible to elaborate on this
point here, but I think there is a strong case for the co-management of sinks (and for sharing the benefits &
costs flowing from them) by local/regional communities and national governments.
